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“Docket numbers 763, 764 and 765,” the bailiff announced, “People v. Bob Johnson, Todd Hatch, and Bruce Martins. Charges are Criminal Facilitation in the Second Degree, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, Unlawful Manufacture of Methamphetamines in the Third Degree, Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the First Degree, Criminal Possession of Marihuana in the Third Degree, Computer Tampering in the First Degree, Tampering with Public Records in the Second Degree, and Murder in the Second Degree.”
“Quite the list,” Judge Torledsky commented. Before he could proceed, the thirtyish brunette representing the DA’s office interjected,
“Your Honor, defendants Johnson and Hatch have reached agreements with the People; each will plead guilty to Man One and Criminal Possession Three in exchange for protective custody and a sentence of eight-and-a-third to twenty-five years.”
“Not bad,” the judge commented. “And what do the People get in exchange for their largesse?”
The brunette pushed her glasses firmly up her nose and smiled faintly, her eyes twinkling mischievously. “Nothing relevant to this proceeding, Your Honor.”
Torledsky snorted. “Of course not. Defendants Johnson and Hatch, how do you plead on the revised charges of Manslaughter in the First Degree and Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree?”
Hatch glanced at his lawyer, who nudged him slightly. “Guilty,” he said, and he was echoed by Johnson.
“Defendants Johnson and Hatch are remanded to the custody of the Department of Corrections,” Torledsky announced with a tap of his gavel. “That leaves Mr. Martins.”
“Deputy Chief Martins, actually,” the remaining lawyer corrected. Torledsky’s eyebrows contracted.
“I beg your pardon?”
“My client,” the lawyer explained. “He’s a Deputy Chief in the NYPD.”
“Who stands accused of murder—and a whole list of other things,” the brunette said, staring at them with mingled disgust and surprise. “He’s been placed on an unpaid suspension pending the outcome of the trial.”
“Suspended, yes,” the defense attorney acknowledged, “but not dismissed.”
“Fine,” Torledsky barked. “Deputy Chief. How do you plead?”
“Not guilty,” Martins responded coolly.
“The People on bail, Miss Dunlevy?”
The brunette continued to look doubtfully at Martins as she replied, “Remand, Your Honor. The defendant used his position of authority within the police department to not only encourage officers under his command to break the law, he sheltered them when they did. The net result of his behavior was an apartment fire that killed three people, two of them preschoolers, and gutted an apartment building. Over a hundred people are homeless because of the defendant’s actions.”
The defense attorney rolled his eyes. “My client didn’t set that fire.”
“No, all he did was train someone to destroy evidence of inaction. He may as well have set it, and those two kids’ deaths are on his hands.”
“Whether or not my client trained the officer in question, the fact is that Deputy Chief Martins didn’t do anything. Actus reus, Your Honor—I don’t see it here.”
“Neither do I, Miss Dunlevy.”
“Your Honor, the statute states that ‘A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when, under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person.’ That is, in fact, what happened when he repeatedly prevented Officer Johnson’s supervisors from taking appropriate disciplinary action against the officer.”
“I’m sorry,” the defense attorney interrupted. “Are the People alleging that Officer Johnson was a deadly weapon?”
“The depraved indifference statute says nothing about a deadly weapon,” Dunlevy retorted with a veiled glare at Martins and his attorney. “It says ‘a grave risk of death.’ The People’s position is that allowing a person who is both incompetent, as evidenced by numerous performance reviews, and arrogant, as evidenced by numerous civilian complaints, to continue as an officer of the law and blocking all attempts to correct these behaviors does, in fact, create a grave risk of death—as evidenced by the fact that three people actually died.”
“This is typical Jack McCoy grandstanding, Your Honor,” the defense attorney said, and Dunlevy suppressed a smile. “My client didn’t do anything.”
“I think that’s the People’s point,” Torledsky replied wearily. “One million dollars bail.”
“My client can’t pay that!” the defense attorney said indignantly.
“I can remand him if you’d prefer,” Torledsky pointed out.
“… We’ll take the bail,” the defense attorney said.
“Fine,” Torledsky said. “Done.”
“Quite the list,” Judge Torledsky commented. Before he could proceed, the thirtyish brunette representing the DA’s office interjected,
“Your Honor, defendants Johnson and Hatch have reached agreements with the People; each will plead guilty to Man One and Criminal Possession Three in exchange for protective custody and a sentence of eight-and-a-third to twenty-five years.”
“Not bad,” the judge commented. “And what do the People get in exchange for their largesse?”
The brunette pushed her glasses firmly up her nose and smiled faintly, her eyes twinkling mischievously. “Nothing relevant to this proceeding, Your Honor.”
Torledsky snorted. “Of course not. Defendants Johnson and Hatch, how do you plead on the revised charges of Manslaughter in the First Degree and Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree?”
Hatch glanced at his lawyer, who nudged him slightly. “Guilty,” he said, and he was echoed by Johnson.
“Defendants Johnson and Hatch are remanded to the custody of the Department of Corrections,” Torledsky announced with a tap of his gavel. “That leaves Mr. Martins.”
“Deputy Chief Martins, actually,” the remaining lawyer corrected. Torledsky’s eyebrows contracted.
“I beg your pardon?”
“My client,” the lawyer explained. “He’s a Deputy Chief in the NYPD.”
“Who stands accused of murder—and a whole list of other things,” the brunette said, staring at them with mingled disgust and surprise. “He’s been placed on an unpaid suspension pending the outcome of the trial.”
“Suspended, yes,” the defense attorney acknowledged, “but not dismissed.”
“Fine,” Torledsky barked. “Deputy Chief. How do you plead?”
“Not guilty,” Martins responded coolly.
“The People on bail, Miss Dunlevy?”
The brunette continued to look doubtfully at Martins as she replied, “Remand, Your Honor. The defendant used his position of authority within the police department to not only encourage officers under his command to break the law, he sheltered them when they did. The net result of his behavior was an apartment fire that killed three people, two of them preschoolers, and gutted an apartment building. Over a hundred people are homeless because of the defendant’s actions.”
The defense attorney rolled his eyes. “My client didn’t set that fire.”
“No, all he did was train someone to destroy evidence of inaction. He may as well have set it, and those two kids’ deaths are on his hands.”
“Whether or not my client trained the officer in question, the fact is that Deputy Chief Martins didn’t do anything. Actus reus, Your Honor—I don’t see it here.”
“Neither do I, Miss Dunlevy.”
“Your Honor, the statute states that ‘A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when, under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person.’ That is, in fact, what happened when he repeatedly prevented Officer Johnson’s supervisors from taking appropriate disciplinary action against the officer.”
“I’m sorry,” the defense attorney interrupted. “Are the People alleging that Officer Johnson was a deadly weapon?”
“The depraved indifference statute says nothing about a deadly weapon,” Dunlevy retorted with a veiled glare at Martins and his attorney. “It says ‘a grave risk of death.’ The People’s position is that allowing a person who is both incompetent, as evidenced by numerous performance reviews, and arrogant, as evidenced by numerous civilian complaints, to continue as an officer of the law and blocking all attempts to correct these behaviors does, in fact, create a grave risk of death—as evidenced by the fact that three people actually died.”
“This is typical Jack McCoy grandstanding, Your Honor,” the defense attorney said, and Dunlevy suppressed a smile. “My client didn’t do anything.”
“I think that’s the People’s point,” Torledsky replied wearily. “One million dollars bail.”
“My client can’t pay that!” the defense attorney said indignantly.
“I can remand him if you’d prefer,” Torledsky pointed out.
“… We’ll take the bail,” the defense attorney said.
“Fine,” Torledsky said. “Done.”
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Link to [Part 40]
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